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1．Introduction
Japan’s colonization of part of Manchuria started in 1906 when Japan obtained the rights and 
properties of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the railway lines between Port Arthur and Xinjing 
and its branches from Russia.1）Since then, economic development projects were researched and 
conducted through public-private partnerships in the South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu). 
Japan undertook significant industrialization in its colony, Manchukuo unlike other Western imperial 
nations. Even Great Britain did not attempt to transfer advanced technology and industry to India. The 
typical pattern of western colonization focused on development of traditional local manufacturing and 
basic agricultural production. Japan, however, started new heavy industries in Manchukuo.2） 
Industrialization of colonies was part of Japan’s competition with more advanced powers in the global 
economy since the increasing world trend toward an economic bloc forced Japan to create its own 
autarkic territory.3）Japan’s colonial development policy was, thus, unique and included a long-term 
foreign policy agenda.  
This study aims to examine how public-private partnerships (PPPs) were utilized in Japan’s colonial 
development policy. PPPs in international development have become significantly important as one of 
the main sustainable development tools. Yet, Japan has pursued its own PPPs approach in Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which prioritizes achieving its national economic interests rather than 
reducing global poverty. This study hypotheses that experiences of colonial economic development 
before World War II had a significant influence on economic development policies in Japan after World 
War II. To examine the hypothesis, this article will focus on PPPs in Japan’s colonial development 
policy in Manchuria, and analyze the history, mechanism, and legacies in the PPPs.
2．Colonial Development Policy in Manchuria
In 1933, the Manchukuo government announced the Outlines for Economic Construction in 
Manchukuo (Manshu Keizai Kensetsu Koyo) that “served as the blueprint for planning economic 
development.”4） The basic principles of this document were 1) economic development projects should 
not benefit only particular groups or classes but for all people in Manchukuo; 2) important economic 
76
divisions should be controlled by the government to achieve balanced economic development with 
developing natural resources; 3) open-door policy and equal opportunity policy for capital and 
technology from other industrialized countries and; 4) mutual cooperation and interdependence with 
Japan should be promoted to establish an East Asian Economic Bloc in the future.5）
 Table 1　 Economic Construction Expenditures in Manchukuo (Unit: 1,000 yen)
Year Expenditure Ratio of Total Expenditure Expenditure index
1932 26,315 20.3% 100
1933 34,777 21.0% 132
1934 28,045 15.5% 107
1935 16,888 16.9% 64
1936 33,149 15.0% 125
1937 59,858 22.3% 227
1938 62,859 19.2% 239
1939 99,104 22.4% 377
1940 178,086 26.3% 679
1941 208,669 27.9% 793
1942 277,708 33.7% 1,055
Source: Manshu Kokushi Kankokai, Manshu Kokushi (kakuron) (Tokyo: Manmo Doho Engokai, 1971), 432.
Table 1 shows that the Manchukuo government had a positive economic construction expenditure 
that expanded ten times in ten years. In 1942, this expenditure (33.7%) also exceeded the national 
defense expenditure (31.7%).6）Yet this expenditure of general account was a subsidy for economic 
development projects that mostly were financed by special government joint-stock companies, and the 
South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu), and Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo). For example, 
Mantetsu’s capital outlay in local administration activities including construction and maintenance of 
schools, libraries, hospitals, hygienic research institutes, and others was 185.91 million yen in 1934.7）
In December of 1942, while celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the foundation of the Manchukuo 
state, The Guidelines for Basic National Policies for the Manchukuo State (Manshukoku Kihon Kokusaku 
Taiko) was prepared by Mantetsu. Since Japan foresaw a positive future at that time, the principal of 
the policy paper focused on establishing “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Outlines for 
Economy (Keizai Koyo), in particular, indicated the guidelines for the next ten-year plan of economic 
development in Manchukuo. The major objective was to complete economic development plans for 
Manchukuo so that it could become an independent state, including even a self-defense system. 
Specifically, not only should economic development plans continue to invest into heavy industries and 
transportation, but also agricultural development and light industries in order to be completely self-
sufficient in the near future.8）
  
Manchukuo’s Five-Year Economic Development Plan
Two Five-Year Economic Development Plans were the vehicles for Japan’s colonial economic 
development approach. The first one was successfully enforced between 1937 and 1941, and the second 
was incomplete but practiced from 1942 to the end of the World War II. According to the Outlines for 
Manchukuo’s Five-Year Industrial Development Plan (Manshu Sangyo Kaihatsu Gokanen Keikaku Koyo), 
Five-Year Plans specifically aimed at 1)the development of natural resources for preparation for wars; 
77Kuramoto：Public-Private Partnerships in Manchuria
2)the establishment of a self-help economy while supplying resources to a needy in Japan; 3)the 
foundation of the infrastructure for industrial development in Manchukuo.9）
The Five-Year Plans attempted to maximize industrialization to enable Manchukuo to manufacture 
its own weapons, munitions, aircraft, and vehicles unlike other colonies. Steel, chemicals, and machine 
tools were also produced more than ever. The Five-Year Plans also had ambitious and specific targets 
for each industrial production. For example, the plan indicated the present capability of production for 
iron (0.85 million tons), the target production (2.53 million tons), and necessary capital (1.17 billion yen).10）
Although the Five-Year Plans could not meet output targets most of the time, the projects at least 
started Manchurian industrialization and assisted further economic development after World War II. 
These economic development plans were a major commitment for Japan at that time. Original 
budget for the first Five-year Economic Plan was 2.5 billion yen exceeding Japan’s national annual 
expense (2.4 billion yen) in 1936. Even the Ministry of Finance agreed that the development project for 
Manchuria should use foreign capital for the projects.11）
After the China Incident in 1937, however, Japan’s government required the Manchukuo 
administrators to expand the budget for the Five-Year Plans from 2.5 billion yen to 6.06 billion yen in 
preparation for the waging war. In detail, 4.99 billion yen was for industrial development projects (82 
percent of total budget), 0.64 billion yen was for transportation and telecommunication projects (13 
percent), and 0.43 billion yen for agricultural development. Initially, the half of the budget was to be 
raised in Japan, 1.69 billion yen in Manchukuo, and 1.33 billion yen from other countries.12）In practice, 
the required capital was supplied only from Japan and Manchukuo as shown in Table 2. Yet the raised 
amount was 6.79 billion yen, which was 110 percent of the original budget.13）
 Table 2　The Result of Supplied Capital for the Five-Year Plans (Unit: million yen)
Year Estimate  Result From Japan In Manchukuo 
1937 418 305 190 (62%) 115 (38%)
1838 858 869 507 (58%) 360 (42%)
1939 1,489 1,654 923 (56%) 731 (44%)
1940 1,743 1,993 1,074 (54%) 919 (46%)
1941 1,551 1,970 1,314 (66%) 656 (34%)
Total 6,060 6,792 4,010 (59%) 2,782 (41%)
Source: Manshu Kokushi Kankokai, Manshu Kokushi (Soron) (Tokyo: Manmo Doho Engokai, 1971), 502.
However, the economic development plans later became a heavy burden on the domestic economy 
since 800 million yen or about one-third of the national debt was used for the loans to Manchuria 
between 1937 and 1939.14）Yet Japan continued to help Manchurian economic development. The 
president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Koshiro Shiba, for example, showed how Japan treated 
Manchuria as its colony.：
Because of shortages of locally produced materials, Manchurian production depends on Japan for production 
materials. Since Japan also short of materials, it is extremely difficult for us to respond to this demand. Of 
course, as we all know, since Manchukuo is the child and Japan is the parent, when the child is in trouble it is 
the parent’s responsibility to come to its aid. Nevertheless, even if – the parent – would willingly to reduce our 
meals from three times to once a day to help Manchuria, the problem for the home islands has gone beyond 
this…. In some cases our shortages are more severe than those in Manchuria.
15）
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In 1940, however, the Japanese government requested three policy changes to the Five-Year Plans 
though Mantetsu was still planning future development projects. First, the comprehensive development 
policy was given up to a priority production policy that would limit economic development in 
Manchuria. Second, although the five-year plans utilized plant and equipment investment to expand the 
scope of economic development, the goal of the plan became only to maximize the total output of war 
materials for Japan. Third, the original goal that would establish its own heavy industry in Manchuria 
was eliminated, and Manchukuo became a slave that would provide only raw or basic materials to 
Japan’s munition industry.16）At this point, Japan’s economic development plan for Manchukuo was 
technically cancelled, and Japan started to exploit Manchuria in preparation for the war against the 
United States.  
Japan’s colonial development policy seemed to be implemented successfully. Although there are 
many methods to evaluate this, it is not easy to measure the effectiveness of economic policies. It is also 
important to take a consideration of what the previous Chinese regime had contributed before Japan 
brought economic mobilization and industrialization in Manchuria. However, the statistics of gross 
domestic product (GDP) should indicate whether the colonial development approach worked. As the 
study of Eckstein, Chao, and Chang in Table 3 shows, the domestic product per capita increased at 
average annual rate of 2 percent, which was a high rate by pre-World War II standards of industrial-
ized countries.17）
 Table 3　Per Capita GDP in Manchuria, 1934-41 (Value in 1934 yuan)
Year Population GDP (million) Per Capita GDP
1924 31,030,000 2,348.0 75.7
1926 32,477,000 2,639.3 81.3
1929 35,759,000 2,986.4 83.5
1934 38,668.000 2,677.1 69.2
1936 39,984,000 3,289.6 82.3
1939 43,035,000 4,174.8 97.0
1941 45,755,000 4,733.3 103.4
Source :  Alexander Eckstein, Kang Chao, and John Chang, “The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise 
of a Frontier Economy”, Journal of Economic History, 34.1, 254. 
3．Public-Private Partnerships in Manchuria 
The exchange of information and frequent communication between government and business helped 
draft and implement better economic policies. Although this system was formally established in Japan 
after World War II as the Sinjikai system, Professor Kobayashi, a political economist, argues that this 
productive government-business cooperation system was first introduced in Manchukuo.18）The close 
relationship among economic bureaucrats, business people and military officials was observed through 
important policy-making processes. In Manchukuo, the General Affairs Office created by the Kwantung 
Army had centralized power for economic policies (called “Somucho Chushinshugi”). Nousuke Kishi, a 
subsequent deputy chief of the General affairs Office, had dinner meetings with business people and 
military officers every night for his three-year stay in Manchuria. The new and important projects that 
would reform the South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) and build Manchurian Heavy 
Industries (Mangyo) was discussed and decided in details by three people, Nobusuke Kishi, Yoshisuke 
Ayukawa, the president of Nissan Corporation, and Yosuke Matsuoka, the president of Mantetsu.19）
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan also attempted to promote cooperation between top 
business executives and economic bureaucrats in Manchuria. In 1936, Kenji Kodama, President of 
Yokohama Specie Bank, was invited to observe the progress of economic development in Manchukuo. 
To fulfill the purpose of the invitation, Kodama created the Kodama Mission to Manchuria. The 
members were Kenji Kodama (President of Yokohama Specie Bank), Kensaku Ohira (Executive 
director of Sumitomo Bank), Keizaburo Kato (President of Bank of Korea), Reisuke Ishida (Executive 
director of Mitsui Trading Company), Ikuki Akiyama (Counselor of Mitsubishi Joint Stock Company), 
Kazuji Iino (President of Boseki Spinning Company and Counselor of Toyo Spinning Company), Shoji 
Otokichi (President of Toyo Spinning Company), Hyakutaro Miyake (President of Nihon Silk Company, 
Executive director of Yusen the largest shipping company, Executive director of Toa Industry, and 
Counselor of Mitsubishi Trading Company), Seijiro Miyajima (President of Nisshin Flour Milling Co, 
LTD and Nissinbo Industries), Aiichiro Fujiyama (Chairman of Japan Sugar Industry Association and 
President of Dai Nihon Sugar Manufacturing), Shin Hori (President of Osaka Commercial Shipping 
Company), Risaburo Toyota (Vice President of Nagoya Chamber of Commerce and Industry, President 
of Toyoda Spinning Company, President of Automatic Weaving machine Company, and Kyoichi 
Aburatani (Japan–China Business Association).20）All twelve-business leaders were involved in trade 
with China at that time. Thus, Japan’s government intended to motivate interest in more investment in 
Manchuria so that the Japan-Manchurian Economic Bloc would be established soon. 
Japan’s Military also considered that economic policies should be discussed with top business leaders 
and economists in order to maximize Japan’s national interests. In the early 1930s, Colonel Kanji 
Ishiwara had his own think-tank. The members of the advisory group included Fumimaro Koeno, who 
later became prime minister of Japan, Nariaki Ikeda from Mitsui Zaibutsu, Yoshisuke Ayukawa, a 
president of Nissan Corporation, and Professor Narumi Hijikata who taught economics at Tokyo 
Imperial University. Economic reform policy such as introducing a controlled economy was suggested 
by this think-tank.21）Therefore, economic development approach in Manchukuo was planned under the 
efficient public-private cooperated system. 
South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu)
The South Manchuria Railway Company is more than a mere railway company; it has been and still 
is the carrier of the light of civilization into Manchuria. In addition to its extensive railway 
undertakings which constitute its main business, the Company operates, as accessory enterprises, coal 
mines, railway workshops, harbors and wharves, warehouses, and hotels; it administers the Railway 
Zone; it conducts schools, libraries, hospitals, and various hygienic institutions; it controls a number of 
joint-stock companies, electric and gas works, shipping and dockyard companies, and several industrial 
concerns and factories; and it carries on a chemical research committee, and several agricultural 
experimental stations and farms.22） 
At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained the rights and properties formerly held by 
Russia in South Manchuria including railroads and mineral rights. In 1906, the South Manchurian 
Railway Company was founded as a private-public join venture under strong state control. Although it 
was created by Japan for the management of the South Manchurian Railway, the South Manchurian 
Railway Company functioned as if a government operated utilities and managed civil organizations 
since its tasks included supervising public affairs related to law, security, education, public health in 
addition to build social and economic infrastructures in Manchuria.23）Initially, the capital fund of 
Mantetsu was 200 million yen, and employed 10,321 people. When Mantetsu was dissolved after forty 
years, the capital had been raised to 2.4 billion yen twelve times the starting capital, with 398,303 
employees, thirty times as much as before.24）Mantetsu became larger than any other Japanese 
company at that time.  
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Although Mantetsu looked like a commercial company, in practice it functioned as a state 
organization to excise colonial rules and manage economic development in Manchuria. Mantetsu 
contained major research institutions including Keizai Chosa Kai for making economic policies. 
Mantetsu was “the brain trust for Manchukuo development, later expanding into a center of planning 
for the empire as a whole.”25）
Mantetsu was also the main pipeline for Japan’s investment to Manchuria. As seen at table 4, Japan’s 
investment went to Mantetsu more than the Manchukuo government. In particular, between 1932 and 
1936, Japan’s capital through Mantetsu founded 29 special and semi-special companies in Manchukuo. 
In 1937, Mantetsu invested in eighty special and semi-special companies with 47 percent of the total 
520 million yen.26） Thus, Japan’s investment was utilized through Mantetsu for the establishment of a 
controlled economy. 
The Japanese government always appointed the president, vice-president and board of directors 
with careful consideration. The first president was Shinpei Goto, who succeeded in the colonial 
management in Taiwan before this important assignment. Zenko Nakayama was chosen as the vice-
president of Mantetsu. Goto and Nakayama became the first directors of the board, and the other 
board members included Masachika Kubota (governor of Tochigi prefecture in Japan), Chotaro Kiyono 
(governor of Akita prefecture in Japan), Katsuyoshi Kubota (director of the Bureau of the National 
Exchequer), Kingaro Nonomura (an official of the Industrial Bank of Japan), and Shinbei Kunizawa (chief 
engineer of Mantetsu).27）
In sum, Mantetsu established fundamental social and economic infrastructures for the heavy 
industrialization of the Five-Year Economic Plans. Mantetsu built many new railway lines, roads, 
harbors, and bridges as economic infrastructures and more schools, libraries, hospitals and better 
sewage systems as social infrastructures. Most of all, Mantetsu’s biggest contribution to economic 
development in Manchuria was enormous research of natural resources, land, Chinese culture and 
traditions. The research helped Japanese colonial policies as well. 
 Table 4　Japanese Investment to Manchukuo  (Unit: million yen (%))
Total Government Mantetsu Mangyo Others
1932 97 20 (20.6) 65 (66.9) - 12 (12.6)
1933 151 30 (19.8) 81 (53.7) - 40 (26.5)
1934 271 10 (3.7) 188 (69.2) - 73 (27.1)
1935 378 71 (18.8) 266 (70.3) - 40 (10.8)
1936 262 38 (14.7) 191 (72.9) - 32 (12.4)
1937 348 75 (21.7) 167 (47.9) 10 (2.9) 95 (27.5)
1938 439 111 (25.3) 79 (18.0) 58 (13.3) 190 (43.4)
1939 1,103 117 (10.7) 290 (26.3) 316 (28.6) 379 (34.4)
1940 1,010 262 (25.9) 343 (34.0) 145 (14.4) 259 (25.7)
1941 1,423 255 (17.9) 376 (26.4) 204 (14.3) 589 (41.4)
1942 1,323 135 (10.2) 286 (21.6) 281 (21.3) 621 (46.9)
1943 989 45 (4.5) 376 (38.0) 152 (15.3) 416 (42.2)
1944 827 35 (4.2) 370 (44.8) 25 (3.0) 397 (48.0)
1945 454 - 220 (48.5) 5 (1.1) 220 (50,4)
Total 9,081 1,206 (13.3) 3,201 (35.2) 1,198 (13.2) 3,477 (38.3)
Source : Yuzo Yamamoto “Manshukoku o Meguru Taigai Keizai Kankei no Tenkai (The Development of External 
Economic Relations of the Manchukuo),”  Manshukoku no Kenkyu, 216.
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Economic Research Association (Keizai Chosa Kai) in Mantetsu
Although the General Staff Office (Sanbobu) and the Ruling Office (Tochibu) were in charge of 
economic policies until 1931, they needed more economic bureaucrats and academia to prepare 
synthetic economic development plans in Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army required the South 
Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) establish a research institution. In 1932, Mantetsu finally 
organized the Economic Research Association (Keizai chosakai) which was also an expansion of the 
Research Section (Chosaka) that had existed from 1908. Though this institution was originally planned 
to serve for one year, it lasted until October 1936 when it merged into the Industry Section (Sangyobu). 
The four main themes of research for the Economic Research Association were as follows:
1． Integration of the Japanese and Manchurian economies and establish a self-help economic 
system in the Japan- Manchurian Economic Bloc,
2． Development and establishment of a strong economy for national defense including the 
development of natural resources,
3． Promotion of immigration and population,
4． Controlled economic policy in Manchuria.28）
These themes were basically the same as the objectives of economic policies for the Manchukuo 
state. In order to achieve the goals, the Economic Research Association was in charge of essential 
research including Manchurian history and the scientific study of raw materials. The preparation for 
executing a controlled economic policy was an important task for this research association as the policy 
later appeared in the Outlines for Economic Construction in Manchukuo (Manshu KeizaiKensetsu Koyo). 
The Economic Research Association started with a staff of around 300, and worked on overall 
economic development with the staff from the Kwantung Army. It was one of the largest think-tanks 
in the world at that time. This research institute was organized for drafting basic economic 
development policy in Manchukuo as follows:
-　The Secretariat (2 groups) – general affairs and accounting groups.
-　 The First Department (6 groups) – Japan-Manchurian economic development plans, economic 
statistics, industry, labor, international economy, and Chinese affairs groups.
-　 The Second Department (6 groups) – agriculture, agricultural emigration, forestry, livestock 
industry, salt industry, fishery, industries, labor issues, heavy-industry, and mining industry.
-　 The Third Department (8 groups) – railways, roads. automobiles, water transportation, harbors, 
aviation, telecommunication, riparian works, city planning.
-　The Forth Department (4 groups) – trade, tariff, commerce, and finance.
-　The Fifth Department (4 groups) – budgets, diplomacy, legislation, education and culture.29）
The Economic Research Association published 829 documents and 1,053 research materials for 
Manchurian economic development.30）“Controlled Economic Policy in Manchuria” was initially drafted 
by Shuichi Kitajo of the First Department, and further polished and completed by the chief examiner 
of the First Department, Masayoshi Miyazaki and the head of the Department, Matsunosuke Yasumori. 
Research for the drafting the controlled Economic policy, which became the core of the Five-year 
Plans, was one of the important contributions for economic development plans in Manchukuo. 
Although the Economic Research Association was united with the section of industries in 1937, it 
was reborn as the Research Institute of Mantetsu (Chosabu). The institute became bigger than ever 
since its budget was 10 million yen and its number of researchers increased to 1,800. This research 
institute had offices in North Manchuria, Tokyo, North China, Shanghai, New York, Paris, and Berlin.31）  
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Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)
In 1936, the Manchukuo government and the Kwantung Army decided to change their development 
plan that counted mainly on Japan’s largest corporation, Mantetsu. The new development plan needed 
more private investments and advice from Japan although the Kwantung Army did not prefer to ask 
old zaibutsu conglomerates like Mitsubishi and Mitsui before since the Army was afraid to fail in 
establishing the controlled economic system if powerful business groups had existed. While the 
Manchurian Five-years Economic Plan was discussed and assembled in Japan, the Kwantung Army 
invited Japanese top-leveled businessmen to Manchuria. Yoshisuke Ayukawa, the president of Nissan, 
was one of them. 
Ayukawa was very interested in the industrial development plans of Manchukuo, and gave 
stimulating and aggressive suggestions to the Kwantung Army. His opinion included that the Five-
Year Development Plans should apply for American development technologies and capital32）because 
he learned modern business management and industrial rationalization when he worked as a young 
intern for a steel company in Buffalo, New York.33）Ayukawa’s ambition and strong invitations from 
Kanji Ishihara of the Kwantung Army, Naoki Hoshino of the Board of General Affairs (Somucho) in 
Manchukuo, and Nubusuke Kishi from the Ministry of Commerce in Japan moved Nissan to Manchuria, 
and established Manchurian Heavy Industries Development Company (Mangyo) in 1937.  
Mangyo was capitalized at 450 million yen, and Mangyo was half-owned by the Manchukuo 
government so that it was a private-public join venture. Mangyo was a large financial source for the 
Five-Year Plans, and managed most steel, automobile, aircraft, light material, and the mining industry. 
Kwantung Army guaranteed the security of Ayukawa’s investment in return. According to Young’s 
research, the deal included: “1) a three–way division of profits, two parts to privately held shares, one 
part to Manchukuo government shares; 2) in case of dissolution, division of remaining equity on the 
same basis; 3) principal and six percent minimum dividends guaranteed by the Manchukuo government 
for ten years after Mangyo’s founding; 4) special tax privileges; 5) no ceiling on dividends or restrictions 
on their use; and 6) protections against fluctuations in the market value of the company’s shares on the 
stock market.”34）
To maximize the results of industrial development in Manchukuo, Mangyo owned and managed 
Showa Steel Works (Showa Seitetsujo), the Penhsihu Ore Mining Company (Manshu Tanko), Dowa 
Automobile Industry (Dowa Jidousha Kogyo) , Manshu Light Metals (Manshu Keikinzoku) and others. 
Thanks to skills and experiences earned under running the Nissan Corporation in Japan, Mangyo could 
increase industrial production for Manchurian economic development. For example, in addition to 
construction of dams for hydroelectric power generation on the Sungari and Yalu rivers, Mangyo built 
electrical transmission lines that were larger than any other in Japan at that time. In a way, Mangyo 
started the Japanese aluminum industry in Manchuria since the industry needed large amounts of 
electric power.35）
Special and Semi-special Companies
“Special” and “semi-special” companies were joint-stock companies with public and private capital, 
and they were created to manage important industries. It was called the “one enterprise managing one 
industry” (Ichigyo Ichisha Shugi) system. This “designated a single enterprise or joint-stock company 
as the agent to coordinate an entire industry on a vertical and horizontal production and distribution 
basis. Each special company had a director and vice-director appointed by the General Affairs Office, 
with the necessary business experience and administrative skills.”36）
In practice, though “special” and “semi-special” companies had managing systems with a board of 
directors, corporate executives from the president down and stockholders like private corporations. 
These companies (in Table 5) were regulated by the government in the following matters: 1) business 
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plans and their modification; 2) company rules and regulations; 3) the disposition of bonuses; 4) the 
subscription of company shares; 5) decisions concerning mergers and liquidations; 6) the transfer and 
sale of important asserts; 7) partial or complete suspension of important business; 8) the appointment 
and removal of the chairman of the board, directors and supervisory personnel.37）
The controlled economic system was influenced by the Soviet Union’s five-year industrialization 
policy. According to Myer’s analysis, Japan and the Soviet Union’s planned economies share some 
similarities and differences.
Northeast and North China resembled the Soviet style economies in that state organs designed and 
implemented periodic input and output plans for the economy, and a bureaucracy regulated modern 
industries and their enterprises. But there were three fundamental differences: the state empowered 
large-scale modern corporation or joint stock companies to manage one or more industries; this new 
type of organization represented a mixture of public and private property rights that enabled state 
resources to be merged with private entrepreneurship, modern technology, and financial capital; and 
finally, these large-scale companies and considerable authority over their allocation of resources and 
pricing.38） 
Modified controlled economic system, were observed in Japan and other East Asian countries after 
the World War II. Strong government interventions and public-private corporations were indispensable 
for drafting and implementing long-term economic development plans. 
Table 5　The List of Special and Semi-special Companies (1936)
Year Type of Company
Capital
10,000yen
Year Type of Company
Capital
10,000yen
1932.  7/1 Central bank 3,000 9/25 Steel 1,000
    9/26 Air Line 800 11/11 Gunpowder 50
1933. 8/31 Telecommunication 5,000 1936. 2/29 Forestry 500
    11/23 Alcohol 167 4/28 Salt 500
1934. 2/24 Oil 1,000 5/22 Chemicals 800
     3/31 Automobiles 620 5/22 Weapons 460
     3/31 Steamship 35 8/1 Colonization 1,500
     4/19 Cotton Mill 200 9/14 Mass media 200
     5/7 Mining 1,600 10/1 Trading Company 1,000
     5/16 Gold 1,200 10/23 Gauge & Meter 300
     11/1 Electrics 9,000 10/23 Insurance 300
1935. 3/11 Developer 550 11/10 Light Materials 2,500
     8/24 Mining industry 500 12/5 Industrial bank 3,000
Source: Akira Hara, Nihon Teikoku Shugika no Manshu, 46.
4．Conclusion
This study attempted to analyze how PPPs worked in Japan’s colonial development policy in 
Manchuria. The case study of Manchuria showed that the public-private cooperation was a major 
feature of Japan’s economic development approach from the decision-making to the implementation 
process. In the prewar and wartime period, the Economic Research Association (ERA) in Mantetsu for 
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Manchurian assisted drafting colonial development policies. Mantetsu and Mangyo were joint-stock 
companies that implemented economic development plans in Manchuria.
PPPs in international development have played a significant policy role for Japan’s ODA. Yet the 
PPPs in its ODA share similarities with colonial policies such as strong state leadership and being 
motivated with national economic interests. To achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), global PPPs should be one of the main policy tools. However, Japan seems to pursue its 
own style of PPPs, which intends to utilize domestic private sectors to maximize its national economic 
gains. Therefore, Japanese PPPs should be opened towards international actors such as foreign 
transnational corporations and international NGOs in order to improve global environment and poverty 
issues instead of prioritize its national interests.     
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